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Abstract
We examine a two-node competitive market, taking into account the losses under transmission and the costs of transmission line
construction. We state a welfare maximization problem and show how to solve it. Moreover, we analyze how the ﬂow of good
between markets aﬀects the beneﬁt of transmission system, consumer surplus and producers’ proﬁt. We also consider a two-node
market under imperfect competition and study the Cournot equilibrium depending on the transmission capacity.
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1. Introduction
Network structure is of high signiﬁcance for many markets of homogeneous goods, for instance, for electricity
and natural gas markets. Consumers and producers are located at diﬀerent nodes; transmission capacities of the lines
between the local markets are limited. Hogan1, Davidson et al.2 consider competitive electricity and gas markets.
The authors provide methods for computations of competitive equilibrium. Vasin and Vasina3 investigate Cournot
competition for a two-node market and determine possible types of Nash equilibrium for this model.
In this paper we examine a two-node market. The goal is to maximize the total welfare and to determine the
optimal transmission capacity as a solution to this maximization problem. The paper is organized as follows. First,
we introduce a model of a two-node market in Sect.2. In Sect. 3 we determine equilibrium for a two-node competitive
market depending on the value of transmission capacity. In Sect. 4 the welfare maximization problem is stated and
the method for computation of the optimal transmission capacity is provided. We also analyze how the ﬂow of good
between markets aﬀects the beneﬁt of transmission system, consumer surplus and producers’ proﬁt. In Sect. 5 we
investigate a two-node market under imperfect competition.
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2. Two-node market
In this section we consider a model of a two-node market. Consumers at the node i = 1, 2 are described by a
continuous, non-increasing demand function di(p): di(p) → 0 as p → ∞. There is a ﬁnite set of producers Ai at the
local market i. Each producer a is characterized by cost function Ea(q) that increases in the output volume q; Ea(q)
is convex, Ea(0) = 0, Ea
′
− (q) → ∞ as q → ∞. Loss coeﬃcient k determines the share of the good that is lost under
transmission. Let C determine the maximal amount of the good that can be transmitted from one market to the other.
Strategy of producer a is a non-decreasing supply function ra(p) that determines the output volume depending
on the price p. First, the network administrator computes clearing prices pi for isolated markets. These prices are
determined by the equations
∑
a∈Ai r
a(pi) = di(pi), i = 1, 2. If 1 − k ≤ p2/p1 ≤ (1 − k)−1, there is no transmission
from one market to the other and the nodal prices are equal to the prices of isolated markets. Otherwise let p2/p1 >
(1 − k)−1. In this case, the network administrator determines the volume of the good v that will be transmitted from
the ﬁrst market to the second market. Under a given ﬂow v, the nodal prices p1(v) and p2(v) meet the equations∑
a∈A1 r
a(p1) = d1(p1) + v,
∑
a∈A2 r
a(p2) = d2(p2) − (1 − k)v. If 1 − k > p2/p1, there would be a similar ﬂow from the
second market to the ﬁrst one.
The network administrator acts as if perfectly competitive intermediaries transmit the good from one market to
the other. There are two possible outcomes. The ﬁrst one corresponds to the following conditions: (1 − k)−1p1(v) =
p2(v) and v ≤ C. Otherwise the ﬂow v from one market to another is equal to the transmission capacity C and
(1 − k)−1p1(v) < p2(v).
3. Equilibrium at competitive two-node market
Under assumption of perfect competition, the optimal strategy of each producer is determined by Walrasian supply
function sa(p) def= Argmaxqa (qap − Ea(qa)). For any p, sa(p) is a bounded and convex set, G(sa(p)) = {(p,Q)|p ≥
0,Q ∈ sa(p)} is closed, sa(0) = 0, sa(p) is non-decreasing (q ≤ q′ holds for any p < p′ and any q ∈ sa(p), q′ ∈ sa(p′)).
The total supply si(p) at the market i is determined as follows: si(p)
def
=
∑
a∈Ai s
a(p), i = 1, 2.
Let p˜i(C), i = 1, 2 denote the prices corresponding to Walrasian supply functions. Prices p˜i(0) meet the equations
di(p˜i) ∈ si(p˜i), i = 1, 2. We assume that (1 − k)p˜2(0) > p˜1(0).
If there is a ﬂow from the ﬁrst market to the second market, the prices satisfy the following conditions:
s1(p˜1) = d1(p˜1) + v, (1)
s2(p˜2) = d2(p˜2) − (1 − k)v, (2)[
v ≤ C, p˜1 = (1 − k)p˜2,
v = C, p˜1 < (1 − k)p˜2. (3)
Consider functions p˜1
0(v) and p˜2
0(v) implicitly determined by (1) and (2) respectively. If v = C, then p˜i(C) =
p˜i
0(C).
Theorem 3.1 shows how the properties of the equilibrium depend on the transmission capacity C.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a value of the transmission capacity Ĉ such that p˜10(Ĉ) = (1 − k)p˜20(Ĉ). If C ≥ Ĉ, then
at the equilibrium
v = Ĉ < C, p˜i(C) = p˜i
0(Ĉ), i = 1, 2. (4)
Otherwise,
v = C, p˜i(C) = p˜i
0(C), i = 1, 2, (5)
p˜1(C) < (1 − k)p˜2(C). (6)
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Proof. First, we show that the function p˜1
0(v) is non-decreasing. Let t j be such that max{s1(t j)} > min{s1(t j)}. Deﬁne
v−j
def
= min{s1(t j)} − d1(t j), v+j def= max{s1(t j)} − d1(t j) for j: t j ≥ p˜10(0). Then p˜10(v) = p˜10(v+j ) and dp˜10/dv = 0 if
v ∈ [max{0, v−j }, v+j ].
The following relation determines the price p˜1
0 for the other values of v : L1(p˜1
0, v) def= d1(p˜1
0) + v − s1(p˜10) = 0.
According to the implicit function theorem,
dp˜1
0/dv = −∂L1(p˜1
0, v)
∂v
/
∂L1(p˜1
0, v)
∂p˜1
0 = −
(dd1(p)
dp
− ds1(p)
dp
)−1
> 0.
Hence, p˜1
0(v) is a non-decreasing function. The same approach can be used to prove that the function p˜2
0(v), satisfying
L2(p˜2
0, v) def= d2(p˜2
0) − (1 − k)v − s2(p˜20) = 0, is non-increasing.
Let Ĉ denote the value of the transmission capacity such that p˜1
0(Ĉ) = (1− k)p˜20(Ĉ). Proceeding from (1) and (2),
we obtain
(1 − k)s1((1 − k)p2) + s2(p2) = (1 − k)d1((1 − k)p2) + d2(p2). (7)
Note that the right-hand part of (7) is non-negative, non-increasing and tends to zero as p2 approaches inﬁnity. The
left-hand part of (7) equals zero if p2 = 0, is non-decreasing and is positive if p2 > Ea
′
(0). Consequently, there exists
a solution to (7) p̂2. If it is not unique, we take the minimal value satisfying (7). Under general assumptions, the
solution for Ĉ = s1((1 − k)p̂2) − d1((1 − k)p̂2) is unique. According to the deﬁnition of Ĉ, p˜i(Ĉ) = p˜i0(Ĉ).
The next step is to prove that the ﬂow v equals Ĉ if C > Ĉ and the equilibrium corresponds to (4). Assume to
the contrary that v = C. It follows that either p˜1(C) = (1 − k)p˜2(C) or p˜1(C) < (1 − k)p˜2(C). In the ﬁrst case C
should be equal to Ĉ, contradicting C > Ĉ. The second case is impossible because the functions p˜i
0(v) are monotonic,
p˜1(Ĉ) = (1 − k)p˜2(Ĉ) and C > Ĉ. Thus, v < C. Hence, p˜1(C) = (1 − k)p˜2(C) and the ﬂow v is determined in the same
way as Ĉ.
Below we show that the ﬂow v is equal to the transmission capacity C if C < Ĉ. Assume to the contrary that v < C.
If this is the case, according to (3) we have p˜1
0(v) = (1 − k)p˜20(v). Hence, v is equal to Ĉ contradicting v < C < Ĉ.
Therefore, (5) holds. Since the function p˜1
0(v) is non-decreasing and the function p˜2
0(v) is non-increasing, we get
(6).
4. Welfare maximization problem
In this section we set a welfare maximization problem and provide a method for computation of the optimal
transmission capacity.
Without taking into account the construction costs, the welfare N(C) includes the beneﬁt of the network system
T (C), consumer surplus S i(C) and producers’ proﬁt Pi(C) , i = 1, 2. The beneﬁt of the network system is determined
by T (C) = p˜2(C)(1− k)C − p˜1(C)C if C < Ĉ. Otherwise it equals zero. Producers at market i get the total proﬁt equal
to
Pi(C) =
∑
a∈Ai
(p˜i(C)sa(p˜i(C)) − Ea(sa(p˜i(C)))) =
∫ p˜i(C)
0
si(p)dp.
Consumer surplus at market i is given by S i(C) =
∫ ∞
p˜i(C)
d1(p)dp . Thus, N(C) is a continuous function.
Let B(C) denote the costs of the transmission line construction: B(C) = 0 if C = 0; B(C) = b f + bv(C) if C > 0,
where bv(C) is a convex and increasing function that determines variable costs; b f deﬁnes constant costs.
Taking into account the construction costs, the total welfare is W(C) = N(C) − B(C). Below we examine the
properties of the function N(C).
Lemma 4.1. Function N(C) is concave and increases in C if C ≤ Ĉ. In addition, N ′ (C) = (1 − k)p˜2(C) − p˜1(C).
Proof. Applying the theorem on the derivative of an integral depending on a parameter, we obtain:
N
′
(C) = s1(p˜1(C))p˜1
′
(C)−d1(p˜1(C))p˜1′ (C)+ s2(p˜2(C))p˜2′ (C)−d2(p˜2(C))p˜2′ (C)+ (1− k)p˜2′ (C)C + (1− k)p˜2(C)−
p˜1
′
(C)C− p˜1(C) = p˜1′ (C)(s1(p˜1(C))−d1(p˜1(C))−C)+ p˜2′ (C)(s2(p˜2(C))−d2(p˜2(C))+ (1−k)C)+ (1−k)p˜2(C)− p˜1(C).
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Since s1(p˜1(C)) = d1(p˜1(C))+C and s2(p˜2(C)) = d2(p˜2(C))−(1−k)C, the derivative F ′ (C) = (1−k)p˜2(C)− p˜1(C) >
0 if C < Ĉ. Function p˜1(C) is non-decreasing, p˜2(C) is non-increasing, therefore (1 − k)p˜2(C) − p˜1(C) is also non-
increasing and N(C) is a concave function.
Theorem 4.2. The optimal transmission capacity C∗ equals zero if (1−k)p˜2(0)− p˜1(0) ≤ b′v(0). If this inequality does
not hold, the value C∗L corresponding to a local maximum is determined by the equation (1 − k)p˜2(C∗L) − p˜1(C∗L) =
b′v(C∗L) and satisﬁes C∗L < Ĉ. If W(C∗L) > W(0) then C∗ = C∗L. Otherwise C∗ = 0.
Proof. Consider a function W0(C) def= N(C) − (b f + bv(C)). It is concave and is equal to the function of the total
welfare W(C) for any C  0. If N
′
+(0) ≤ b′v(0), W0(C) attains the maximum at C∗ = 0. Since W(0) = W0(0) + b f >
W0(0) ≥ W0(C) = W(C) for any C  0, the optimal transmission capacity equals zero. Otherwise, for C > 0 the value
C∗L corresponding to a local maximum satisﬁes the condition N ′ (C) = (1 − k)p˜2(C) − p˜1(C) = b′v(C) > 0. Thus, the
optimal transmission capacity C∗ < Ĉ.
In order to determine the optimal transmission capacity C∗ the values W(C∗L) and W(0) should be compared.
We also would like to address the question: for whom is the ﬂow from one market to the other proﬁtable? The
network system gets proﬁt equal to p˜2(C∗)(1 − k)C∗ − p˜1(C∗)C∗, because C∗L < Ĉ. At the ﬁrst market producers
win ΔP1 =
∫ p˜1(C∗)
p˜1(0)
s1(p)dp, consumers loose ΔS 1 =
∫ p˜1(C∗)
p˜1(0)
d1(p)dp. At the second market consumers win ΔS 2 =∫ p˜2(0)
p˜2(C∗)
d2(p)dp and producers loose ΔP2 =
∫ p˜2(0)
p˜2(C∗)
s2(p)dp. Construction of the transmission line should be paid by
those agents who get the extra proﬁt.
5. Two-node auction under imperfect competition
Now consider the case where the structure of the market at each node is an oligopoly. Previous papers3,4 show that
the stable equilibrium outcome for the uniform price auction coincides with the Cournot equilibrium outcome under
certain conditions. Vasin and Vasina3 consider three types of Nash equilibria for Cournot competition in a two-node
market. At the type a equilibrium, the local markets stay separated. For the type b equilibrium, the ﬂow between the
markets is less than the transmission capacity. At the type c equilibrium, transmission capacity constraint is binding.
Consider the model of Cournot competition for a two-node market. A strategy of producer a is its production
volume qa ∈ [0,Va]. Let −→qi = (qa, a ∈ Ai) be a strategy proﬁle for the node i = 1, 2, −→q = (qa, a ∈ A1, A2) be a
total strategy proﬁle. For the separated markets, the prices p∗0i , i = 1, 2 are p
∗0
i (
−→qi) = d−1i (
∑
a∈Ai q
a), i = 1, 2. At the
type a equilibrium, transmission of the good is unproﬁtable since the prices for the separated markets meet conditions
λ−1 < p∗2/p
∗
1 < λ, where λ = (1 − k)−1. The ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) for such equilibrium are:
qa∗ ∈ (p∗i − Ea
′
(qa∗))|d′i (p∗i )| , for every a ∈ Ai such that Ea
′
(0) < p∗i , i = 1, 2, (8)
qa∗ = 0 if Ea
′
(0) ≥ p∗i , (9)
where Ea
′
(q) = [Ea
′
− (q), Ea
′
+ (q)] at the jump points of the marginal cost function. Conditions (8), (9) implicitly deter-
mine the equilibrium volume for each producer a ∈ Ai, depending on the price p∗i . This mapping saiC(p∗i ) is called the
Cournot supply schedule5 for the market i, it is closed and convex-valued. If d
′
i (p) is non-increasing for p such that
di(p) > 0 then the Cournot supply schedule is non-decreasing. The equilibrium price p∗i is uniquely determined under
general assumptions from the equation
∑
a∈Ai s
a
iC(p
∗
i ) = di(p
∗
i ), i = 1, 2.
At the type b12 equilibrium, v ∈ (0,C) and λp∗1 = p∗2. Under small variations of the price, the demand at the ﬁrst
market is d1(p1) + λ(d2(λp1) −∑a∈A2 qa). Thus the price pb1 meets the equation∑
a∈A1
qa = d1(pb1) + λ(d2(λp
b
1) −
∑
a∈A2
qa). (10)
The FOCs for this type of equilibrium are: for every a ∈ A1
qa∗ ∈ (p∗b1 − Ea
′
(qa∗))|d′1(p∗b1 ) + λ2d
′
2(λp
∗b
1 )| if Ea
′
(0) < p∗bi , (11)
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qa∗ = 0 if Ea
′
(0) ≥ p∗bi . (12)
For producers at the second market, the demand is d2(λp1) + 1/λ(d1(p1) − ∑a∈A1 qa), and the FOCs for the Nash
equilibrium are
qa∗ ∈ (λp∗b1 − Ea
′
(qa∗))|d2′(λp∗b1 ) + d1′(p∗b1 )/λ2| if Ea
′
(0) < p∗bi , (13)
qa∗ = 0 if Ea
′
(0) ≥ p∗bi . (14)
Conditions (11), (12) and (13), (14) determine the equilibrium volumes qa = saiC1−2(pi) depending on the price pi for
a ∈ A1 and a ∈ A2 respectively. Then the equilibrium price proceeds from (10).
At the c12 type equilibrium, v = C and λp∗1 < p
∗
2. The total supply at each market balances the demand:∑
a∈A1
qa∗ = d1(p∗c1 ) +C, (15)
∑
a∈A2
qa∗ = d2(p∗c2 ) − λ−1C. (16)
The FOCs are the same as in the case a:
qa∗ ∈ (p∗ci − Ea
′
(qa∗))|di′(p∗ci )| if Ea
′
(0) < p∗ci , (17)
qa∗ = 0 if Ea
′
(0) ≥ p∗ci . (18)
Substituting saiC(p
∗c
i ) for q
a∗ in (15) and (16), we ﬁnd p∗c1 and p
∗c
2 . Denote siC(p) =
∑
a∈Ai s
a
iC(p), i = 1, 2, the total
Cournot supply for the separated market i, siC1−2(p) =
∑
a∈Ai s
a
iC1−2(p) - the total Cournot supply of the node i under
the joint market.
Vasin et al.6 ﬁnd one more possible type of Cournot equilibrium. At the type d12 equilibrium, v = C and λp∗1 = p
∗
2.
The FOCs for producers at the ﬁrst node are
(p∗1 − Ea
′
− (q
a∗))|d′1(p∗1) + λ2d′2(λp∗1)| ≥ qa∗ ≥ (p∗1 − Ea
′
+ (q
a∗))|d′1(p∗1)|, a ∈ A1,
that is equivalent to sa1C1−2(p
∗
1) ≥ qa∗ ≥ sa1C(p∗1).
The FOCs for the second node are
(λp∗1 − Ea
′
− (q
a∗))|d′2(λp∗1)| ≥ qa∗ ≥ (λp∗1 − Ea
′
+ (q
a∗))|d′2(λp∗1) + d′1(p∗1)/λ2|.
Note that such inequality can hold only if d′1(p
∗
1) = 0 or q
a∗ is a jump point for Ea(q).
The given above conditions are necessary but not suﬃcient for Nash equilibria. The points meeting these conditions
correspond to local equilibria. Since in this paper we do not study stability with respect to large deviation, we omit
“local” below.
Vasin and Vasina3 show that some types of equilibrium are incompatible with others. Below we specify these
relations.
Theorem 5.1. a) If p∗01 > λp
∗0
2 then, for any C > 0, equilibria of the types a and c1−2 do not exist. (If λp
∗0
1 < p
∗0
2 then,
for any C > 0, equilibria of the types a and c2−1 do not exist.)
b) If λ−1 < p∗02 /p
∗0
1 < λ then, for any C > 0, there exists an a-type equilibrium, while c-type equilibria do not exist.
c) If b1−2 type equilibrium exists for some C˜ then d1−2 type does not exist for C = C˜ and b2−1 and d2−1 type
equilibria do not exist for any C > 0.
Proof. a) If p∗01 > λp
∗0
2 , a-type equilibrium does not exist according to its deﬁnition. Let p
∗c
1 , p
∗c
2 meet conditions
(15)-(18), hence, s1C(p∗c1 ) = d1(p
∗c
1 ) + C, s2C(p
∗c
2 ) = d2(p
∗c
2 ) − λ−1C. Since siC(p) and di(p) are monotonic and C > 0
we obtain p∗c1 > p
∗0
1 and p
∗c
2 < p
∗0
2 . Therefore λp
∗c
1 > p
∗c
2 and equilibrium of the type c1−2 does not exist. The
proposition for the case λp∗01 < p
∗0
2 is proven in a symmetric way.
b) If λp∗01 > p
∗0
2 , we obtain λp
∗c
1 > p
∗c
2 , and equilibrium of the type c1−2 does not exist. If λp
∗0
2 > p
∗0
1 then
λp∗c2 > p
∗c
1 and equilibrium of the type c2−1 does not exist.
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c) First, we show that if b1−2 type equilibrium exists then d1−2 type does not exist forC = C˜. Assume to the contrary
that equilibrium of the d1−2 type with the prices p∗di exists. According to the d1−2 type deﬁnition, s1C1−2(p
∗d
1 ) ≥
d1(p∗d1 ) + C˜ and d2(p
∗d
2 ) − λ−1C˜ ≥ s2C1−2(p∗d2 ). From the ﬁrst inequality, we obtain p∗d1 > p∗b1 , and from the second -
p∗d2 < p
∗b
2 , contradicting λp
∗d
1 = p
∗d
2 .
Below we assume that λ = 1. The next step is to show that if b1−2 type equilibrium exists then b2−1 type equilibrium
does not exist. If we assume that b1−2 and b2−1 type equilibria exist then the prices in these equilibrium are equal.
However, inequalities s1C1−2(p∗b1 ) − d1(p∗b1 ) > 0 and s1C1−2(p∗b1 ) − d1(p∗b1 ) < 0 can not hold simultaneously.
Finally, we prove that if b1−2 type equilibrium exists, d2−1 type equilibrium does not exist. Denote p1 such that
d1(p1) = s1C1−2(p1) and p2 such that d2(p2) = s2C1−2(p2). Hence, p1 < p∗b1 < p2. Assume to the contrary that
equilibrium of d2−1 type with the prices p∗di exists. Then, d1(p
∗d
1 )− λ−1C ≥ s1C2−1(p∗d1 ) and d2(p∗d2 )+C ≤ s2C1−2(p∗d2 ).
From the ﬁrst inequality, we obtain p∗d1 < p1, and from the second - p
∗d
2 > p2, contradicting p
∗d
2 = p
∗d
1 .
We assume that di(p) > 0 and d′i (p) is non-increasing if p ∈ (0,Mi); di(p) = 0 if p ≥ Mi; p∗01 , p∗02 < Mi,
i = 1, 2. Below we study the Cournot equilibrium depending on the transmission capacityC. DeﬁneC = λ(d2(λp∗b1 )−∑
a∈A2 q
a∗), where p∗b1 and q
a∗ meet (10)-(14). Thus,
s1C1−2(p∗b1 ) = d1(p
∗b
1 ) +C, (19)
s2C1−2(λp∗b1 ) = d2(λp
∗b
1 ) − λ−1C. (20)
Theorem 5.2. Let C determined by (19)-(20), p∗01 , p
∗0
2 , M1, M2 meet conditions λp
∗0
1 < p
∗0
2 < M2 < M1, C > 0. Then
there exists at most one equilibrium for any C > 0. Moreover, there is a value C ∈ (0,C) such that if C ∈ (0,C) then
there exists a c1−2 equilibrium; if C > C, there exists a b1−2 equilibrium; if C ∈ (C,C), only d1−2 type equilibrium is
possible.
Proof. Let C denote the value of the transmission capacity such that (15)-(18) hold and λp∗c1 = p
∗c
2 .
Proceeding from (15)-(18), we obtain
s1C(p∗c1 ) + λs2C(λp
∗c
1 ) 
 d1(p∗c1 ) + λd2(λp∗c1 ) (21)
The left-hand part of (21) is non-decreasing if p∗c1 ∈ (0,M2), equals zero if p∗c1 = 0, is positive if p∗c1 > Ea
′
(0). The
right-hand part of (21) is non-negative, non-increasing and tends to zero as p∗c1 approaches inﬁnity. Consequently,
there exists a solution to (21) p̂∗c1 . If it is not unique, we take the minimal value satisfying (21). Under general
assumptions, the solution for C = s1C(p̂∗c1 ) − d1(p̂∗c1 ) is unique.
Below we show that 0 < C < C. Proceeding from siC1−2(p) > si(p), i = 1, 2, (19)-(21), we obtain p̂∗c1 ≥ p∗b1 . Hence,
s2C(λp∗b1 ) ≤ s2C(λp̂∗c1 ) ≤ s2C1−2(λp̂∗c1 ). Assuming to the contrary that C > C, we obtain s2C1−2(λp̂∗c1 ) ≥ s2C(λp∗b1 ) =
d2(λp∗b1 ) − λ−1C > d2(λp∗b1 ) − λ−1C ≥ d2(λp̂∗c1 ) − λ−1C, contradicting the deﬁnition of C. Since p∗02 > λp∗01 , then
s2C(λp∗01 ) − d2(λp∗01 ) < s2C(p∗02 ) − d2(p∗02 ) = 0. Thus, s1C(p∗01 ) + λs2C(λp∗01 ) < d1(p∗01 ) + λd2(λp∗01 ). Consequently,
p̂∗c1 > p
∗0
1 and C > 0.
The next step is to prove that, for C < C, the type b1−2 equilibrium does not exist. Assume to the contrary that
v ∈ (0,C), λp∗1 = p∗2 and (10)-(14) hold. The ﬂow v is determined in the same way as C, contradicting v ∈ (0,C).
Thus, if C < C, v = C. If C > C there exists a type b1−2 equilibrium, because v = C < C.
Let us show that, if C ∈ (0,C), there exists a c1−2 equilibrium. Consider functions p1(C) and p2(C) implicitly
determined by conditions d1(p1)+C = s1C(p1) and d2(p2)− λ−1C = s2C(p2). Applying the implicit function theorem,
we derive p′1(C) = 1/(s
′
1C(p1)− d′1(p1)) ≥ 0 and p′2(Q) = λ−1/(d′2(p2)− s′2C(p2)) ≤ 0. Hence, p1(C) is non-decreasing
and p2(C) is non-increasing.
We prove that if C < C, the ﬂow v is equal to transmission capacity C and the equilibrium corresponds to type
c12. Assume to the contrary that v < C. It follows that p1(v) = λ−1p2(v), i.e. v should be equal to C, contradicting
v < C < C. Since functions pi(C) are monotonic, λp∗1 < p
∗
2 holds.
Now we show that, if C > C, the type c equilibrium does not exist. Assume to the contrary that v = C and
λp1(C) < p2(C). Since C > C, λp1(C) = p2(C) and functions pi(C) are monotonic, this is impossible.
Therefore, if C ∈ (C,C) then v = C and λp∗1 = p∗2, corresponding to the type d equilibrium.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated a two-node competitive market, taking into account the losses under transmis-
sion. We have shown how to solve the welfare maximization problem for a two-node competitive market. Moreover,
we have examined the Cournot equilibrium depending on the transmission capacity. Our results can be used to study
the problem on the optimal transmission capacity for a two-node market under imperfect competition.
Acknowledgements
The research was supported by RFBR, project No. 14–01–91163 GFEN a.
References
1. Hogan W. Competitive electricity market design: a wholesale primer. Tech. Rep. Harvard Electricity Policy Group; 1998.
2. Davidson MR, Dogadushkina YV, Kreines EM, Novikova NM, Seleznev AV, Udaltsov YA, Shiryaeva LV. Mathematical model of power system
management in conditions of a competitive wholesale electric power (capacity) market in Russia. Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences
International 2009;48:243-253.
3. Vasin AA, Vasina PA. Electricity markets analysis and design. Working Paper 2006/053. Moscow New Economic School; 2006.
4. Vasin AA, Vasina PA, Ruleva TY. On organization of markets of homogeneous goods. Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International
2007;46:93-106.
5. Green RJ, Newbery DM. Competition in the British electricity spot market. Journal of Political Economy 1992;100:929-953.
6. Vasin A, Sosina Y, Weber GW. Evaluation of market power in local and two-node markets. In: Mazalov VV, editor. International Workshop
Networking Games and Management NGM-2012. Extended abstracts. KarRC RAS; 2012. p. 66-69.
